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Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut

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On August 20, 1982, President Reagan announced the agreement by the Governments of Lebanon, the United States, France, Italy, and Israel and by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to a plan for the departure from Lebanon of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut.

Following are the President's statement and Secretary Shultz's news conference (excerpts relating to the Middle East), a fact sheet concerning details of the agreed-upon arrangements, the texts of the departure plan and schedule, the exchange of notes between the U.S. and Lebanese Governments, and President Reagan's letters to the U.N. Secretary General and the Congress.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, AUG. 20, 1982

Thank you all and let me just say in advance I'll be taking no questions because Secretary Shultz, a little later in the day, will be having a full press conference, so you can take everything up with him.

Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, President's special emissary to the Middle East] has informed me that a plan to resolve the west Beirut crisis has been agreed upon by all the parties involved. As part of this plan, the Government of Lebanon has requested, and I have approved, the deployment of U.S. forces to Beirut as part of a multinational force (MNF). The negotiations to develop this plan have been extremely complex and have been conducted in the most arduous circumstances. At times it was difficult to imagine how agreement could be reached and yet it has been reached. The statesmanship and the courage of President Sarkis and his colleagues in the Lebanese Government deserve special recognition as does the magnificent work of Ambassador Habib. Phil never lost hope and in the end his spirit and determination carried the day, and we all owe him a debt of gratitude.

The parties who made this plan possible have a special responsibility for insuring its successful completion, or implementation. I expect its terms to be carried out in good faith and in accordance with the agreed timetable. This will require meticulous adherence to the cease-fire. Violations by any party would imperil the plan and bring renewed bloodshed and tragedy to the people of Beirut and under no circumstances must that be allowed to happen. As you know, my agreement to include U.S. forces in a multinational force was essential for our success. In the days ahead, they and forces from France and Italy will be playing an important but carefully limited noncombatant role. The parties to the plan have agreed to this role and have provided assurances on the safety of our forces.

Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibility for insuring the departure of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government over the Beirut area. In no case will our troops stay longer than 30 days. The participation of France and Italy in this effort is further evidence of the sense of responsibility of these good friends of the United States.

Successful resolution of the west Beirut crisis by responsible implementation of the plan now agreed will set the stage for the urgent international action required to restore Lebanon's full sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity; obtain the rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country; and help insure the security of northern Israel. We must also move quickly in the context of Camp David to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, as well as the other unresolved problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only when all these steps are accomplished can true and lasting peace and security be achieved in the Middle East.

SECRETARY SHULTZ'S NEWS CONFERENCE, AUG. 20, 1982

The President today announced that a plan to resolve the crisis in west Beirut has been agreed upon by all the parties, and that in connection with that plan the Government of Lebanon has asked the United States, and the President has agreed, to the deployment of U.S. forces as part of a multinational force to help the Government of Lebanon to implement the plan.

He also expressed his admiration and his thanks to Phil Habib, and I

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would like to take this occasion to add my thanks to Phil, a truly great American.

The President also said that I would answer the questions, so here I am.

Q. Have American-Israeli relations suffered because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and on a broader scale, how do you judge the impact of the fighting on American-Arab relations?

A. The Israeli-U.S. relationship remains a strong one. We are completely committed to the support of the security of Israel. Certainly there have been some strains during this period. The United States opposed the entry of Israeli troops into Lebanon. There were some occasions when it seemed to us that the Israeli military actions were excessive, and we said so. So those times presented great strains. But underneath it all the relationship between the United States and Israel remains a strong one.

There's no question about the fact—turning to the second part of your question—that our relationships with our friends in the Arab world have been strained, and understandably so, as they have seen the suffering in Lebanon and the great destruction in Beirut. We seek to resolve those issues. I think the constructive role that the United States has played in the development of this plan, and Phil Habib's actions, show the fundamental commitment of the United States to peaceful solutions and the ability of the United States to be a constructive force in the region.

Q. Following withdrawal of Palestinian forces from west Beirut, do we expect the Israelis to attack other Palestinian and Syrian forces in the country, and what, if anything, are we trying to do to prevent that from happening?

A. What we expect and what we hope for is that as this process unfolds the Government of Lebanon will be able to take control, first in Beirut, then increasingly throughout the country. And that the forces of Israel, the forces of Syria, the forces of other armed groups in the country will withdraw or lay down their arms and Lebanon will become a country free of foreign forces.

I might note that in the plan, if you look at the first section, which is labeled "Basic Concept," you'll see that this notion is explicitly stated as being consistent with the objectives of the plan.

Q. I wonder if you could amplify what the President said. He said that if American forces were shot at, there would be a recall of U.S. forces. In that sort of violent environment, it is possible for stray bullets to be flying. Would a single shot result in an American call-back?

A. The President was not referring to some stray shot by some kook that might be fired. We're talking about a situation in which all the parties have agreed to a cease-fire and have agreed to establish the conditions under which the departure of the PLO can take place with safety. We are there to help in that process, help the Government of Lebanon in that process. We will stay there as long as that process is going forward and as long as the basic conditions envisaged for our forces remain in effect.

Q. We've heard a lot about Ambassador Habib's role in all of this. What do you envision as his role in the next phase which is the evacuation of all foreign troops from Lebanon?

A. He's a very skillful man. He's been over there since early June, and I think he deserves a good night's sleep. But he's very skillful and very capable, and he told me on one occasion that he never says no to a President. So I imagine his talents will be called upon from time to time in the future.

Q. Has the Government of Israel given you any assurances that they intend to withdraw from Lebanon in the near future?

A. When Foreign Minister Shamir was here, I asked him that question directly. He told me that Israel does not covet one inch of Lebanese territory and plans to withdraw from Lebanese territory. I looked at him and I said, "We will take you at your word."

Q. On the previous question on Mr. Habib—is it contemplated that Mr. Habib will conduct the next round of negotiations on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and do you have any time frame in mind, and the venue, on how and when these talks should begin?

A. I think that it is important to be working strongly not only for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, but for that to happen in such a manner that the Government of Lebanon has strength and the security concerns of Israel and its northern border are adequately safeguarded.

Beyond that, I think, we must recognize that there has been a tremendous amount of destruction and displacement in Lebanon. The extent of it varies widely in peoples' estimates but even the most modest estimates show that it's considerable. We and others around the world need to address ourselves to those problems and start thinking in constructive terms about what needs to be done to help the people of Lebanon reconstruct their land and bring it back to the conditions that it once enjoyed.

Q. Will Mr. Habib actually do the negotiating for the United States?

A. Phil's precise role has not been determined. As I said, he has been at it for a couple of months of very tiring work, and it's time for him to get a good night's sleep. We do plan to have a Lebanon task force in the government and Morris Draper, who has been Phil's assistant, will head that up; Peter McPherson, the head of the Agency for International Development, is going to take on the special concern of the reconstruction and development aspects of this plan. Some other people are being put in place to work on this. I don't say that Phil will have no role in it. He's a very constructive and able person, but I do think at this point that he'll obviously want to see the departure go on in a good way. But at some stage of the game, as I say, we have to give him a good night's sleep.

Q. It's not clear to me, in the way you answered some of the earlier questions, whether you expect further negotiations to take place to obtain the withdrawal of the Syrians and the Israelis or whether you expect them to do that voluntarily, without any further diplomatic activity. Could you clarify that a little bit?

A. I'm sure that the Syrians must feel that they, having been invited in by the Government of Lebanon, would expect to hear from the Government of Lebanon about its wishes. Again, I was told by the Syrian Foreign Minister that they were there at the request of the Government of Lebanon and when the Government of Lebanon requested them to leave, they would do so.

So I think what we are looking at here is a process in which the Government of Lebanon increasingly takes control; and as that happens and as security arrangements on Israel's northern border can be adequately developed, we should expect to see these forces withdraw. I can't tell you that all that can

take place in an easy, uncomplicated way. There's no doubt about the fact that it will be complicated and difficult.

Q. How long do you think it will take?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. There is talk of an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty as the next step after withdrawal. Will the United States actively support such a peace treaty?

A. I think it is constructive to have peace in that part of the world. With the emergence of a strong and legitimate Government of Lebanon, that is certainly something we would hope they would consider very strongly.

Q. But will we actively support it?

A. Sure.

Q. What is the possibility of the use of American troops in some type of multinational force such as is going into Beirut now to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon itself?

A. We don't have any plan for that at all.

Q. Will this be used as a precedent, do you think?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Do you foresee the formation of a Palestinian state at some point? If so, when, and what are you going to do with all these Palestinians that you are splitting up and sending to all these various countries, just leave them there?

A. The Palestinians that are departing from west Beirut probably number in the range of 6,000–7,000, and that is a number than can be assimilated. Where they go eventually, of course, remains to be seen. I do think, and have emphasized before—and practically everybody who talks about the subject emphasizes—the importance of turning to the problems of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, working at that, and negotiating about that.

My own observation is that the language of Camp David is quite worth reading in that regard. So we would expect to be moving on that front, as I'm sure others will too, because it represents an underlying issue of great importance and is one that is at the center of all this.

Q. Since you brought up Camp David, could you give us, as best you can foresee it now, the startup again of the autonomy talks, the timetable, including whether or not you are going to appoint a new special negotiator at any time in the near future?

A. I can't really comment with any clarity on those questions. Obviously, the parties to those talks are heavily engaged in their thinking in the west Beirut problem. It will take some time and a lot of effort to construct a suitable negotiating situation, and I don't want to put down some sort of marker on it.

Q. Ambassador Habib is quoted as telling Prime Minister Begin that he thought it was Israel's military pressure which brought the PLO to agree finally to leave Beirut. Do you agree with that assessment?

A. I'm not going to try to analyze what may or may not have brought the PLO to agree to leave west Beirut. Fairly early on they had made a statement in principle that they would withdraw. We went through a long period of trying to identify where they would go, and during that period there were many doubts expressed about whether in the end they would go. We felt that they had said they would, and we would take them at their word and expect that they would.

Q. But the greatest progress was made in the negotiations, wasn't it, after August 1 when the heaviest Israeli bombings took place?

A. The discussions that gave more and more assurance as to where they would go materialized obviously as these negotiations went on. It was quite a struggle at first and became more definite.

Q. How do you intend to try to blend, or what is your own sense of priorities about resolving the rest of the issues in Lebanon, getting the foreign forces out, etc., and dealing with the Palestinian problem on the West Bank and Gaza?

A. Both issues are important. There is, obviously, some connection between them, but they are also separate issues. I think we, obviously, have to work—it's my opinion obviously, anyway—on both. It is difficult to lay down a timetable, but both are matters of urgency. I think that this moment in time—with the bloodshed and the damage done in Lebanon freshly in peoples' minds—is a time to work hard on this, because people must be able to see that the alternative to a reasonably peaceful situation in the Middle East is not a pleasant thing to contemplate at all. So perhaps it is a moment when people can turn their eyes from the problems of war to the problems of peace--at least I hope so—and that is going to be our effort.

Q. Specifically what steps is the United States prepared to take to get the autonomy talks moving again?

A. We are working on that, thinking about it, and trying to develop our own thinking, as I'm sure others are. When we have gotten our thoughts properly constructed, we will be able to tell you what they are. I have been thinking about that myself, obviously, before I came into the government and ever since I've been here at the President's direction. I've had several meetings with the President about it. At his instruction, I've been meeting with Members of the Congress, we have had people come in from outside, and we've had lots of discussion about this as various ministers from Israel and Arab countries have visited here. So we are actively thinking about it. And we expect to be in moving on it.

Q. Along those lines, the biggest and most dramatic impact of all this, at least for the moment, is the breaking up of the PLO into composite groups moving into different parts of the Middle East. What effect do you think this is going to have on the peace prospects in the region? And do you agree with those who feel that makes it less urgent for the Palestinian issue to be addressed?

A. I think that it makes it more urgent because to the extent the armed and, I think, disruptive presence of the PLO and their impact on Israel and perhaps on some of the problems in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is less, then perhaps the opportunities are more. Rather than feel—if that particular pressure is off—you should relax, my attitude would be exactly the opposite: If the opportunity is greater, you should move in harder and faster and try to take advantage of it.

Q. What is your position on Jewish settlements, either new settlements or the expansion of the existing ones in the occupied territories?

A. The President has said to me recently, when a question arose about their legality, the question isn't whether they are legal or illegal; the question is are they constructive in the effort to arrange a situation that may, in the end, be a peaceful one and be one in which the people of the region can live in a manner that they prefer. His answer to that is no, expansion of those settlements is not a constructive move. I agree with the President. I really do agree with it. I'm not just following his lead.

Q. Next month is the deadline within the Lebanese constitutional framework for a presidential election. Security is one of the reasons cited why the election was put off until next week and might be put off again. Obviously, in general, the United States has a lot of influence in a situation like this right now. It has gained more influence; it's having forces coming in there which will help provide security. What are your views on the holding of the Lebanese presidential election? Should it be in the next month, as originally planned?

A. I think, basically, the conduct of an election in a country, the development of its own governmental processes, and the identification of the president and other officials of the country are matters for that country. The role of the United States is, as we are, to be helpful to the Government of Lebanon, at their request, as they seek to take control of Beirut and the country generally. Beyond that, I think the issue of the election of a new president and other related matters are essentially a matter for the Government of Lebanon, not for us.

Q. In the wake of what Menahem Begin calls a great victory, what would make you believe that Israel would become more flexible in terms of dealing with the Palestinian problem? And has the Government of Israel given us any assurances that they would be willing to discuss this more amenably?

A. What the outcome of discussions will be and how much flexibility will be shown by various parties to it remains to be seen. I think that the prospect of peace, particularly in the light of the conflict in Lebanon that we've seen recently—and for that matter, the conflict in Lebanon that has been going on since 1975—should convince people that if there is any genuine prospect of peace, it should be seized. Perhaps that will be an incentive for everyone to give and take and try to construct something that might work.

Q. Do you believe that the PLO has any role to play in the negotiations process, or do you think that it does not represent the Palestinian people and is better not involved?

A. As far as the United States is concerned, the President has set out well-known conditions for any contacts between the United States and the PLO directly, and we stand by those conditions. If the PLO meets those conditions, obviously the United States would be willing to talk with them. Whether others would be willing to talk with them, those others will have to say for themselves.

I think it is quite clear that, if there is to be a negotiation, that has as one of its center objectives meeting the legitimate concerns of the Palestinian people, there have to be representatives of the Palestinian people involved in those negotiations. No one accepts a result that they didn't have any part in. Who that should be remains to be seen. I don't know the answer to that question, but I know that an answer to it needs to be found.

Q. Could you give us an idea of how much U.S. funding is going to be involved in the evacuation and whether or not we will be reimbursed?

A. I don't think that what funding we supply we will be reimbursed for. We have, I think, committed around $2 million by now for the chartering of ships and things of that kind, and perhaps we will spend a little bit more money on that sort of thing. Others will also bear some expense as they receive the PLO contingents that come to their countries, so it will be a shared expense. That is the order of magnitude, and I don't see where any reimbursement would come from.

Q. Your fact sheet states U.S. troops will go in probably 5 or 6 days after the evacuation begins.

A. That's right.

Q. Is there a trigger mechanism for that to happen? Is there some condition to be met before those U.S. troops go in?

A. Just that we observe that the conditions precedent to the whole operation are in force and the departures are taking place as scheduled and there is a basically nonhostile environment.

. . . . .

Q. What is going to happen now to Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, and have you received any assurances from the PLO indirectly that there will not be any further terrorist attacks on Israel, either through Jordan or perhaps through Syria? What assurances?

A. I think by this time perhaps people can see that what terrorism evokes is not so much fear but abhorrence from the world community. It is unfortunate that there is such an amount of terrorism. But I think by this time people are pretty well convinced that it's something bad all around, and very strong measures increasingly are being taken against it. I would imagine that any capable analytical person would be able to see that.

Q. During this news conference I've been informed that President Carter has charged that—

A. I think it's a little tough on me—

Q. I know.

A. —that you get some information—

Q. —I apologize that it's only happened—

A. —that comes in while I'm here that I don't have access to it. It's like sitting in front of the Senate for confirmation. All those fellows are going in and out—and ladies—all the time, and I'm just sitting there. I don't know what has happened.

Q. I will explain to you what has happened, as far as I know—

A. You're blind siding me.

Q. —and I don't think you'll be totally blind sided because it's not the first time we've heard this charge, but I've been told that President Carter—and I cannot vouch for the truth of whether he actually said it or not—has charged that Washington gave the go-ahead to Israel for the invasion of Lebanon. I'm sure that I'm not blind siding you because that you've heard from other sources before. Can you answer that charge?

A. It is not correct.

Q. Did not Secretary of State Haig, your predecessor, know in advance that Israel was going to strike into Lebanon?

A. My understanding is that the U.S. Government was not informed, and the U.S. Government was and is on the record as having opposed that invasion. Whether somebody came through here and talked about it as a possibility, I don't know. People talk about all kinds of possibilities.

Q. Who goes in first? Who's the advance element that's spoken of, if it's not American forces?

A. You mean in the Beirut situation?

Q. In Beirut, right.

A. I think that's in all the fact material. The first element of the multinational force is the French with about 350. Let me correct that. It basically is the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon and their armed forces to provide for the safety of these departures and, of course, to take control of the city and their country. The multinational force is there to assist the Government of Lebanon.

The first contingent is the French contingent of about 350 who will be stationed, I think, in the immediate port area in the beginning. The U.S. troops, the balance of the French, and the Italian will enter about 5 days after the departures start.

Q. You just talked about the necessity of addressing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the next phase after Beirut. Are you willing to tell us whether those legitimate rights include the rights for self-determination and independence? In other words, what's your definition of these legitimate rights for the Palestinians?

A. Precisely what that will wind up meaning will have to emerge from a negotiation, I'm sure. The words "self-determination" seem to have taken on terms of art. But I would say, as I've indicated earlier, if people are going to accept some solution, they have to have a part in forming it. Certainly one would expect, as the language of Camp David makes clear, that the Palestinians should have a role in determining the conditions under which they will be governed.

Q. In going through the agreement, I don't see anything mentioned about verifying that the PLO has, in fact, left Beirut. Maybe I just passed over it, but I wondered if you could address that problem?

A. Arrangements have been made to, in effect, check off people as they leave so that there is a verification of how many people have left and so on, and where they have gone. That process will be undertaken, and I believe that is basically a responsibility of the Government of Lebanon to do.

Q. You just mentioned in one of your answers that Arab-American relations are now strained. It doesn't seem to have passed on to some of those Arab governments that when the United States made clear to Israel what the United States wanted, Israel did stop the bombing. Looking to the future, do you intend again to make clear to Israel to really pursue a negotiated solution which will be acceptable to all parties in the Middle East?

A. My hope is that everyone will look at what has happened in the last few weeks and feel that it means that we must all concentrate on creating a just peace. This shining objective will be the principal motivating force for everyone.

Q. Can I just come back to Camp David? You've talked a lot about peace and rights of Palestinians, and you also talked about Camp David. Before the Lebanon crisis erupted, Secretary Haig was about to launch into an intensified effort to revive the talks between Egypt and Israel on the ground rules for the self-governing authority, as it's called, as well as other leftover points that hadn't been negotiated.

Are you looking for ways beyond this, or are you willing to continue that negotiating track which has been on and off for the last several years as a first step toward this interim solution which is called for in Camp David? I'm not sure whether you want to stay with Camp David or not.

A. The language of Camp David, as I read it, has lots of room for ideas as to how the situation might be arranged. I have been listening to many people. You mentioned Dr. Kissinger and others—Sol Linowitz, Irving Shapiro, Larry Silberman, Members of Congress—talking with the President. We're trying to form our ideas about what we think in a general way should be a reasonable outcome and what kind of process will get us there. As I said at the beginning of this statement, there is a lot of room within the Camp David language, and I think when you see a situation like that it's worthwhile to preserve that.

Q. A lot of room for what?

A. A lot of room for many different interpretations as to what that language means, but it's just the kind of language that is generally used, and I recognize that different people put different meanings on it.

Q. Your fact sheet that your department handed out about the sending of these forces suggests strongly that you plan to report to Congress under the War Powers Act under a provision which is not binding in the sense that the troops are not required to be out after 60 days. As you know, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Zablocki, and of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Percy, argue that it should be under the more binding provision because of both the situation and the precedent involved. In that view is it correct that you're planning, as this suggests, but doesn't exactly say, to go under the nonbinding provision and, if so, why?

A. The President will make a decision about what section of the War Powers Act to use at the time of the introduction of American forces. I believe under the law he's required to make that statement within 48 hours of their deployment, and I'm sure that he will do so. He'll have to decide at the time what is the right section.

I would say this: that, first of all, the President has stated explicitly that we have a 30-day time limit here, and that is right in the plan, rather than 60 days as your question suggested. Second, if we have a basically peaceful departure situation in west Beirut and this government announces that its forces are going in under what it considers conditions of imminent hostility, I wonder what the message is?

I think we have to be cognizant of what the real facts are on the ground and suit our determination to that. I believe the President will certainly be doing that, and I don't want to prejudge what decision he will make. But I think the basis for the decision should be the conditions on the ground rather than some notion about the number of days or something of that kind. The President has already specified the limit on the number of days.

Q. Would you just finish up the Camp David questions that have been brought up? What evidence is there today that President Mubarak is as anxious to proceed along the framework of Camp David, no matter how you work within this large framework, as was his predecessor? There's some evidence he is not that keen, is there not?

A. I think that, as we noted earlier, people throughout the Arab world are very upset about the events in Lebanon, and it has had a profound effect on their attitudes. I know that. That will represent a problem that we'll have to contend with. As we go along here we certainly expect to work with President Mubarak and the Egyptians. They have been an essential part of this whole peace process, and I would have every expectation that in the end they will still want to be a part of the peace process.


Lebanon
International boundary
Armistice Line, 1949
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Road
Railroad
0 5 10 15 Kilometers
0 5 10 15 Miles
SYRIA
ASH SHAMĀL
AL BIQĀ'
JABAL LUBNĀN
AL JANUB
ISRAEL
Mediterranean Sea
Tripoli
Ba'labakk
Zahlah
Damascus
Dimā
Ad Dimās
Al Qunaytirah
GOLAN HEIGHTS (Israeli occupied)
UNDOF Zone
Aş Şanamayn
Aş Şūrah aş Şughrā
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
36°00'
36°30'
34°30'
34°00'
33°00'
35°30'

FACT SHEET

Plan for the Departure of the PLO

A plan for the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, officers, and combatants in Beirut has been accepted by the Governments of Lebanon, the troop-contributing countries, and Israel and by the PLO. That plan includes a schedule of departures which is also attached to the bilateral notes exchanged between the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries.

The PLO will go to various countries in the region including Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria.

Departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure arrangements.

The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces their heavy and crew-served weapons, spare weaponry and equipment along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. They and the Arab Deterrent Force will also provide detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On departure, PLO personnel may carry with them an individual side weapon and ammunition.

The Arab Deterrent Force (i.e., the Syrians) and those forces attached to the Arab Deterrent Force will also redeploy from Beirut during the period of the PLO departure. The Syrian military forces will take their equipment with them except for that which, by mutual agreement, is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

MNF Composition, Area of Operations, and Mission

Force Composition. The multinational force, which will be deployed to the Beirut area at the request of the Government of Lebanon, will be comprised of approximately 400 Italian, 800 French, and 800 U.S. military personnel. The U.S. portion of the MNF will be comprised of Marines of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit presently serving with elements of the Sixth Fleet on duty in the eastern Mediterranean.

Area of Operations. The MNF will operate in and around the Beirut area. It will take up positions and operate from locations determined by mutual agreement between the various national contingents and the Lebanese Armed Forces through the mechanism of a Liaison and Coordination Committee.

Mission. The multinational force will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out its responsibilities for insuring the safe and orderly departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in a manner which will insure the safety of other persons in the area, and which will further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

Duration of the MNF Mandate. It has been mutually agreed between the Government of Lebanon and those governments contributing forces to the MNF that these forces will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned. There is also provision for the immediate termination of the mandate of the MNF and for its withdrawal from Beirut in the event that the departure from Lebanon of PLO personnel does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule.

Role and Mission of U.S. Forces in Beirut

U.S. forces will be deployed to Beirut as part of the multinational force based on an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon.

The U.S. contingent of the multinational force will provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of PLO personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

U.S. forces will enter Beirut after the evacuation is well underway (probably 5 or 6 days thereafter) in concert with the Italian MNF contingent and the remainder of the French force. Approximately 800 Marines from Sixth Fleet units will be deployed. Command authority for the Marines will be exercised by the National Command Authority (NCA) through normal American military channels (EUCOM). These forces will not engage in combat by may exercise the right of self-defense. They will have freedom of movement and the right to undertake actions necessary to perform their mission or to support their personnel. U.S. personnel will be armed with usual infantry weapons.

Close coordination will be maintained with the Lebanese Armed Forces. There will be an exchange of liaison officers among the elements of the MNF and the Lebanese Armed Forces. A Liaison and Coordination Committee composed of representatives from the U.S., French, Italian, and Lebanese armed forces will assist this process. The Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces are taking measures necessary to insure the protection of U.S. forces including having secured assurances from armed elements that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

The U.S. contingent will be in Beirut for no more than 30 days.

War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution requires a report to Congress within 48 hours after the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces: (1) into foreign territory while equipped for combat; or (2) into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

There is no intention or expectation that U.S. forces will become involved in hostilities in Beirut. They will be in Lebanon at the formal request of the Government of Lebanon; we will have assurances regarding the safety and security of the multinational force. Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of violence, all appropriate precautions will be taken to assure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their brief assignment to Lebanon.

These matters will, in any event, be kept under constant review, and the President will report to Congress consistent with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

Agreements and Assurances

U.S. forces will participate in the multinational force in Beirut pursuant to an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon.

That agreement is in the form of an exchange of notes signed by Ambassador Dillon on behalf of the U.S. Government and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Boutros on behalf of the Lebanese Government.

The agreement describes the missions of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the MNF, and the U.S. forces participating in the MNF. It contains provisions concerning command authority for U.S. forces, coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and immunities of U.S. personnel. Annexed to the agreement is the schedule for the PLO departure from Beirut.

In accordance with the agreement, the Government of Lebanon has secured assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. The Government of Israel has provided appropriate assurances.

Role of the ICRC in Moving the PLO from West Beirut

The role envisaged for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in moving the PLO from west Beirut is still being finalized on the basis of discussions in Geneva and Beirut.

In accordance with its charter, the ICRC will be expected to care for the sick and wounded combatants while in transit. Initially, the ICRC will arrange transport and provide medical care for the sick and wounded PLO personnel going to Greece.

Financing the Departure of the PLO From West Beirut

The cost of chartering transport of the PLO combatants to receiving countries will be funded through international organizations. The United States is prepared to provide initial funding from State Department funds.

Estimates regarding the cost of evacuating PLO forces from west Beirut currently range from $2 to $4 million. This figure could be increased, however, as the number of people to be transported and their ultimate destinations are finalized.

DEPARTURE PLAN

PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, OFFICES, AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT

1. Basic Concept. All the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants in Beirut will leave Lebanon peacefully for prearranged destinations in other countries, in accord with the departure schedules and arrangements set out in this plan. The basic concept in this plan is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all foreign military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon.

3. U.N. Observers. The U.N. Observer Group stationed in the Beirut area will continue its functioning in that area.

4. Safeguards. Military forces present in Lebanon—whether Lebanese, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or any other—will in no way interfere with the safe, secure, and timely departure of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways.

- The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the basis of having secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touch.
- The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch.

5. "Departure Day" is defined as the day on which advance elements of the multinational force (MNF) deploy in the Beirut area, in accordance with arrangements worked out in advance among all concerned, and on which the initial group or groups of PLO personnel commence departure from Beirut in accord with the planned schedule (see page 9).

6. The Multinational Force. A temporary multinational force, composed of units from France, Italy, and the United States, will have been formed—at the request of the Lebanese Government—to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibilities in this operation. The Lebanese Armed Forces will assure the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants, from whatever organization in Beirut, in a manner which will:

(A) Assure the safety of such departing PLO personnel;

(B) Assure the safety of other persons in the Beirut area; and

(C) Further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

7. Schedule of Departures and Other Arrangements. The attached schedule of departures is subject to revision as may be necessary because of logistical requirements and because of any necessary shift in the setting of Departure Day. Details concerning the schedule will be forwarded to the Israeli Defense Forces through the Liaison and Coordination Committee. Places of assembly for the departing personnel will be identified by agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the PLO. The PLO will be in touch with governments receiving personnel to coordinate arrival and other arrangements there. If assistance is required the PLO should notify the Government of Lebanon.

8. MNF Mandate. In the event that the departure from Lebanon of the PLO personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the agreed and predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

9. Duration of MNF. It will be mutually agreed between the Lebanese Government and the governments contributing forces to the MNF that the forces of the MNF will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned, or in accord with the termination of the mandate of the MNF provided for above.

10. The PLO leadership will be responsible for the organization and management of the assembly and the final departure of PLO personnel, from beginning to end, at which time the leaders also will all be gone. Departure arrangements will be coordinated so that departures from Beirut take place at a steady pace, day by day.

11. Lebanese Armed Forces Contribution. The Lebanese Army will contribute between seven and eight army battalions to the operation, consisting of between 2,500–3,500 men. In addition, the internal security force will contribute men and assistance as needed.

12. ICRC. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will be able to assist the Government of Lebanon and Lebanese Armed Forces in various ways, including in the organization and management of the evacuation of wounded and ill Palestinian and Syrian personnel to appropriate destinations, and in assisting in the chartering and movement of commercial vessels for use in departure by sea to other countries. The Liaison and Coordination Committee will insure that there will be proper coordination with any ICRC activities in this respect.

13. Departure by Air. While present plans call for departure by sea and land, departures by air are not foreclosed.

14. Liaison and Coordination:

• The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for liaison with the PLO as well as with other armed groups and will provide necessary information.

• The Lebanese Armed Forces and MNF will have formed prior to Departure Day a Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the MNF participating governments and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The committee will carry out close and effective liaison with, and provide continuous and detailed information to, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). On behalf of the committee, the Lebanese Armed Forces will continue to carry out close and effective liaison with the PLO and other armed groups in the Beirut area. For convenience, the Liaison and Coordination Committee will have two essential components:

(A) Supervisory liaison; and
(B) Military and technical liaison and coordination.

The Liaison and Coordination Committee will act collectively; however, it may designate one or more of its members for primary liaison contact who would of course act on behalf of all.

• Liaison arrangements and consultations will be conducted in such a way as to minimize misunderstandings and to forestall difficulties. Appropriate means of communications between the committee and other groups will be developed for this purpose.

• The Liaison and Coordination Committee will continually monitor and keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

15. Duration of Departure. The departure period shall be as short as possible and, in any event, no longer than 2 weeks.

16. Transit Through Lebanon. As part of any departure arrangement, all movements of convoys carrying PLO personnel must be conducted in daylight hours. When moving overland from Beirut to Syria, the convoys should cross the border into Syria with no stops en route. In those instances when convoys of departing PLO personnel pass through positions of the Israeli Defense Forces, whether in the Beirut area or elsewhere in Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces will clear the route for the temporary period in which the convoy is running. Similar steps will be taken by other armed groups located in the area of the route the convoy will take.

17. Arms Carried by PLO Personnel. On their departure, PLO personnel will be allowed to carry with them one individual side weapon (pistol, rifle, or submarine gun) and ammunition.

18. Heavy and Spare Weaponry and Munitions. The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces as gifts all remaining weaponry in their possession, including heavy, crew-served, and spare weaponry and equipment, along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. The Lebanese Armed Forces may seek the assistance of elements of the MNF in securing and disposing of the military equipment. The PLO will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces by providing, prior to their departure, full and detailed information as to the location of this military equipment.

19. Mines and Booby Traps. The PLO and the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) will provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the MNF (through the Lebanese Armed Forces) full and detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps.

20. Movement of PLO Leadership. Arrangements will be made so that departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure operation.

21. Turnover of Prisoners and Remains. The PLO will, through the ICRC, turn over to the Israeli Defense Forces, all Israeli nationals whom they have taken in custody, and the remains, or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all Israeli soldiers who have fallen. The PLO will also turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces all other prisoners whom they have taken in custody and the remains, or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all other soldiers who have fallen. All arrangements for such turnovers shall be worked out with the ICRC as required prior to Departure Day.

22. Syrian Military Forces. It is noted that arrangements have been made between the Governments of Lebanon and Syria for the deployment of all military personnel of the Arab Deterrent Force from Beirut during the departure period. These forces will be allowed to take their equipment with them, except for that—under mutual agreement between the two governments—which is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. All elements of the Palestinian Liberation Army, whether or not they now or in the past have been attached to the Arab Deterrent Force, will withdraw from Lebanon.

SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES

August 21, 1982—Departure Day

The advance elements of the MNF (approximately 350 men) land at the Port of Beirut at about 0500 and deploy in the Beirut port area in preparation for the initial departures of PLO groups by sea.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Armed Forces deploy to previously agreed positions in the Beirut area, primarily in the so-called demarcation line area, to assist in the departure of PLO personnel. The Lebanese Armed Forces will take over positions occupied by the PLO.

The PLO will insure that National Movement Forces [collection of Lebanese militias] which had occupied these positions jointly with the PLO shall also withdraw.

As the day proceeds, the Lebanese Armed Forces will take up such other positions as necessary to assist in the departure of PLO personnel.

Meanwhile, the initial group of PLO personnel assemble in preparation for departure by sea later in the day (or on August 22). The vessel or vessels to be used for this purpose will arrive at pier on August 21.

The initial groups could include the wounded and ill, who would be transported in accordance with agreed arrangements—by sea or land, or both—to their destinations in other countries.

The initial group or groups of PLO personnel destined for Jordan and Iraq would move from their assembly point to the waiting commercial vessel or vessels for onward transport by sea.

August 22

All groups destined for Jordan or Iraq will have boarded ship and will have sailed from Beirut.

Duplicating the model followed on August 21, PLO groups destined for Tunisia assemble and move to the Port of Beirut for departure by sea.

August 23

All PLO personnel destined for Tunisia complete their assembly and embark on commercial vessel for Tunisia.

PLO personnel destined for South Yemen assemble and move to a vessel for departure then or on August 24.

August 24–25

Assembly and departure by sea of PLO personnel destined for North Yemen.

August 25

Provided that satisfactory logistical arrangements have been completed, the initial groups of PLO personnel destined for Syria assemble and move overland via the Beirut-Damascus highway to Syria.

The advance French elements of the MNF already in the port area will have taken up such other agreed positions on the land route in the Beirut area as necessary to assist in the overland departure of the PLO personnel for Syria.

The Lebanese Armed Forces join with the French in occupying such positions.

(If it should be agreed that these initial groups should go by sea to Syria rather than by land, this departure schedule also is subject to amendment to assure that logistical requirements are met.)

August 26–28 (Approximately)

The remaining forces of the MNF (from the United States, France, and Italy) arrive in the Beirut area and deploy to agreed locations as determined through the Liaison and Coordinating Committee. This movement may be accompanied by the transfer of the advance French elements previously in the port area and elsewhere to other locations in the Beirut area.

August 26–27–28

PLO groups destined for Syria continue to move—by land or sea—to Syria.

August 23–September 4

Turnover to the Lebanese Armed Forces of PLO weaponry, military equipment, and ammunition in a continuing and orderly fashion.

August 29–30–31

Redployment out of Beirut of the Syrian elements of the ADF.

September 1–4

Completion of the departure to Syria—by land or sea—of all PLO or Palestine Liberation Army personnel destined for Syria.

September 2–3

Assembly and departure by sea of all PLO personnel destined for the Sudan.

Assembly and movement by sea of all PLO personnel destined for Algeria.

September 4–21

The MNF assists the Lebanese Armed Forces in arrangements, as may be agreed between governments concerned, to insure good and lasting security throughout the area of operation.

September 21–26

Departure of MNF.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Lebanese Note Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF

Beirut
August the 18th, 1982

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon
U.S. Embassy, Beirut

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the many conversations between their Excellencies the President of the Republic of Lebanon, the Prime Minister and myself on the one hand, and with Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Special Emissary to the President of the United States of America, on the other hand, as well as to the resolution of the Council of Ministers passed today. I have the honor to refer to the schedule set up by the Government of Lebanon, after consultations with interested parties, in order to assure the withdrawal from Lebanese territory of the Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants related to any organization now in the Beirut area, in a manner which will:

(1) assure the safety of such departing persons;

(2) assure the safety of the persons in the area; and

(3) further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

In this context, the Government of Lebanon is proposing to several nations that they contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. The mandate of the MNF will be to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out the foregoing responsibilities, in accordance with the annexed schedule. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement. It is understood that, in the event that the withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 800 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions:

- The American military force shall carry out appropriate activities consistent with the mandate of the MNF.
- Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.
- The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF. To assure effective coordination with the LAF, the American force will assign liaison officers to the LAF and the Government of Lebanon will assign liaison officers to the American force. The LAF liaison officers to the American force will, *inter alia*, perform liaison with the civilian population and

manifest the authority of the Lebanese Governement in all appropriate situations.

• In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.

• The American force will depart Lebanon not later than thirty days after its arrival, or sooner at the request of the President of Lebanon or at the direction of the United States Government, or according to the termination of the mandate provided for above.

• The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the American force's personnel, to include securing the assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

• The American force will enjoy both the degree of freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission or for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, it shall enjoy all facilities necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes. Personnel in the American force shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the administrative and technical staff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigration and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing Lebanon. Personnel, property and equipment of the American force introduced into Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to your Excellency's government, that your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this note, shall constitute an agreement between our two governments, to enter into force on the date of your Excellency's reply.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

FUAD BOUTROS
Deputy Prime Minister/
Minister of Foreign Affairs

U.S. Reply to Lebanese Note Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF

August 20, 1982

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of 18 August 1982 requesting the deployment of an American force to Beirut. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 800 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions, in accordance with the schedule annexed to your Excellency's note. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will in this way facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my government.

I have the further honor to inform you that my government accepts the terms and conditions concerning the presence of the American force in the Beirut area as set forth in your note, and that your Excellency's note and this reply accordingly constitute an agreement between our two governments.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Ambassador of the
United States of America

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL, AUG. 20, 1982[1]

Letter dated August 20, 1982, from the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General

I have the honour to transmit the following message from the President of the United States:

"Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

"As you know, the Government of the Republic of Lebanon has requested the deployment of a multinational force in Beirut to assist the Lebanese armed forces as they carry out the orderly and safe departure of Palestinian personnel now in the Beirut area in a manner which will further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area. The Lebanese Government has asked for the participation of United States military personnel in this force, together with military personnel from France and Italy.

"I wish to inform you that the United States Government has agreed, in response to this request from the Lebanese Government, to deploy a force of about 800 personnel to Beirut for a period not exceeding 30 days. It is my firm intention and belief that these troops will not be involved in hostilities during the course of this operation.

"The deployment of this United States force is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. It furthers the goals of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) adopted in June at the beginning of the Lebanese conflict. The force will plan to work closely with the United Nations observer group stationed in the Beirut area.

"This agreement will support the objective of helping to restore the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. It is part of the continuing efforts of the United States Government to bring lasting peace to that troubled country, which has too long endured the trials of civil strife and armed conflict.

RONALD REAGAN"

I have the honour to request that the present letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 34 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN
Ambassador

[1]Circulated as a document of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council (A/37/393–S/15371, Aug. 21, 1982).

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, AUG. 24, 1982[2]

On August 18, 1982, the Government of Lebanon established a plan for the departure from Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership, offices, and combatants in Beirut. This plan has been accepted by the Government of Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization has informed the Government of Lebanon that it also has accepted the plan. A key element of this plan is the need for a multinational force, including a United States component, to assist the Government of Lebanon in carrying out its responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of these personnel under safe and orderly conditions. This will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

In response to the formal request of the Government of Lebanon, and in view of the requirement for such a force in order to secure the acceptance by concerned parties of the departure plan, I have authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to participate on a limited and temporary basis. In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am hereby providing a report on the deployment and mission of these members of the United States Armed Forces.

On August 21, in accordance with the departure plan, approximately 350 French military personnel—the advance elements of the multinational force—were deployed in Beirut together with elements of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the departure of Palestinian personnel began. To date, Palestinian personnel have departed Lebanon in accordance with the terms of the plan.

On August 25, approximately 800 Marines began to arrive in Beirut. These troops are equipped with weapons consistent with their non-combat mission, including usual infantry weapons.

Under our agreement with the Government of Lebanon, these U.S. military personnel will assist the Government of Lebanon in carrying out its responsibilities concerning

[2]Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate.

SS - copy

the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of our forces will in this way facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority in the Beirut area. Our forces will operate in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which will have 2,500–3,500 personnel assigned to this operation, as well as with a total of approximately 800 French and 400 Italian military personnel in the multinational force. Transportation of the personnel departing is being carried out by commercial air and sea transport, and by land. According to our agreement with the Government of Lebanon, the United States military personnel will be withdrawn from Lebanon within thirty days.

I want to emphasize that there is no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities. They are in Lebanon at the formal request of the Government of Lebanon. Our agreement with the Government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces. All armed elements in the area have given assurances that they will take no action to interfere with the implementation of the departure plan or the activities of the multinational force. (The departure has been underway for some days now, and thus far these assurances have been fulfilled.) Finally, the departure plan makes it clear that in the event of a breakdown in its implementation, the multinational force will be withdrawn. Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of violence, all appropriate precautions have thus been taken to assure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their brief assignment to Lebanon.

This deployment of the United States Armed Forces to Lebanon is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

This step will not, by itself, resolve the situation in Lebanon, let alone the problems which have plagued the region for more than thirty years. But I believe that it will improve the prospects for realizing our objectives in Lebanon:

- a permanent cessation of hostilities;
- establishment of a strong, representative central government;
- withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- restoration of control by the Lebanese Government throughout the country; and
- establishment of conditions under which Lebanon no longer can be used as a launching point for attacks against Israel.

I also believe that progress on the Lebanon problem will contribute to an atmosphere in the region necessary for progress towards the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region under Camp David, based firmly on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

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